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chapter 12A
Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to 
Provide Services in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
12.0 Services: The New Economic Epicenter
When the internal market was established, the European economy primarily 
revolved around goods.1 The free movement of services, therefore, was consid-
ered to be a residual freedom that applied where the other freedoms did not.2 
In the age of Google and Goldman Sachs, this picture has drastically changed. 
Services now constitute over 70% of the European economy. Consequently, the 
free movement of services has also significantly increased in importance.
Considering the increasing importance of services for the EAC as well, this 
Chapter primarily focuses on the free movement of services as gradually devel-
oped by the CJEU. For as we will see, the enormous pluriformity of services, 
ranging from abortion to construction and from banking to healthcare, raises 
all kinds of challenges, certainly when one tries to apply the same standard 
internal market test to all of them. The freedom of services has also given 
rise to one of the most contested and contorted pieces of EU legislation so 
far, the Services Directive. In addition to services, this Chapter also covers the 
main elements of the freedom of establishment, which is closely connected to 
services.3
12.1 The Freedom to Provide Services
This section first discusses the freedom to provide services as laid down in the 
TFEU and developed by the CJEU. It subsequently outlines what are considered 
1   See EU Chapters 9 and 10.
2   This original position can still be seen in the formulation of Article 57 TFEU, and interestingly 
the residual nature of services seems to have carried over to the EAC as well, see Chapter 12.
3   See for further reading amongst many others V. Hatzopoulos, Regulating Services in the 
European Union (OUP, 2012) or I. Liaonos and O. Odudu, Regulating Trade in Services in the 
EU and the WTO: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (CUP, 2012).
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restrictions to the free movement of services and how these may be justified. 
Lastly, the Services Directive is briefly introduced, as it forms one example 
from EU law that the EAC might not necessarily want to fully emulate.
12.2 The Freedom to Provide Services: Treaty Basis
The freedom to provide services is laid down in Article 56 TFEU:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member 
State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.4
Article 57 TFEU adds that:
Services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the 
Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as 
they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement 
for goods, capital and persons. (. . .) Without prejudice to the provisions 
of the Chapter relating to the right of establishment, the person provid-
ing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the 
Member State where the service is provided, under the same conditions 
as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.
As with the other freedoms, Article 56 and 57 TFEU only provide a very general 
outline. As a result, it was up to the CJEU to further develop several key issues, 
including the concept of a service itself, the demarcation between services and 
establishment and the question of who is allowed to rely on the freedom to 
provide services.
12.3 The Concept of a Service
Services are defined in the Treaty as all economic activities that are normally 
provided for remuneration and that are not covered by the other freedoms. 
4   Article 56 TFEU has vertical direct effect, see already Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 
129, par. 26. The horizontal effect has not yet been explicitly accepted by the CJEU, as will be 
discussed further below.
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The definition of a service therefore turns on two points: 1) what counts as an 
economic activity for remuneration and 2) what distinguishes a service from 
the other freedoms, especially from establishment?
12.3.1 An Economic Activity for Remuneration
To qualify as a an economic activity it suffices that an activity is normally done 
in return for some form of consideration.5 This consideration may be very 
little and does not even have to be in money, nor is it required that the service 
provider seek to make a profit.6 The CJEU has also found that the consider-
ation itself does not have to be paid by the person receiving the service. The 
only thing that matters is that the provider receives some form of consider-
ation, not who pays it.7 Consequently, the consideration may also be paid by 
a third party, including by the state. This is a particularly important extension 
of the concept of a service. It means that all kinds of semi-public services, such 
as healthcare or education, that are provided by private parties but paid for by 
the state or public insurance schemes, may fall under the free movement of 
services.8 Even these sensitive political areas, therefore, have to comply with 
the EU rules on free movement, and may in principle not restrict foreign pro-
viders. Only where an activity is fully provided by the state itself, such as in the 
case of public schools run by the government, it does not constitute a service 
and therefore falls outside the scope of free movement law.9
More generally, the moral dubiousness or political sensitivity of an activ- 
ity does not remove it from the scope of Article 56 TFEU. As long as an activity 
is legal and normally provided for remuneration, it qualifies as a service.10 
Consequently, the case law on services reaches some of the more contested 
5    See inter alia Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, par. 17, Case C-422/01 Skandia and 
Ramstedt [2003] ECR I-6817, par. 23, and Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz 
[2007] ECR I-0000, par. 38.
6    See Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paras. 50 and 52 as well as Case 
C-281/06 Jundt ECLI:EU:C:2007:816.
7    Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others [1988] ECR 2085, par. 16, and Joined Cases 
C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, par. 56, Smits en Peerbooms par. 58.
8    Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, par. 55, Case C-385/99 Müller-
Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, par. 103, and especially Case C-372/04 Watts 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:325. Also see on this point G. Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 
29 LIEI 27.
9    Case C-263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. Case C-109/92 Wirth, however, determined that 
private education can form a service under art. 56 TFEU.
10   On the exclusion of illegal activities from free movement law see inter alia Case C-137/09 
Josemans [2010] ECR I-13019.
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and/or colorful outer reaches of human activity, including abortion, gambling 
and prostitution.11 Grogan, for example, concerned students handing out 
information on UK abortion clinics in Ireland. At that time, abortions were 
illegal in Ireland, as was going abroad for an abortion. This prohibition was 
based on a moral conviction widely shared by the Irish population, and 
was laid down in the Irish constitution, yet the large majority of other Member 
States allowed abortion.12 Sidestepping the fierce debate on the morality of 
abortion, the CJEU focused on legality and remuneration to determine if abor-
tion qualified as a service:
Whatever the merits of those argument on the moral plane, they cannot 
influence the answer to the national court’s first question. It is not for 
the Court to substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those 
Member States where the activities in question are practised legally.13
Abortion was a ‘medical activity which is normally provided for remuneration’ 
and was ‘lawfully practiced in several Member States’, and therefore qualified 
as a service.14 As the relation between the students and the economic activ-
ity of the abortion clinic was too remote, however, in this particular case the 
students could not rely on Article 56 TFEU, providing the CJEU an escape from 
this moral, legal and political dilemma.15 After this judgment, a Treaty protocol 
was adopted that provided legal protection to the Irish ban on abortion against 
free movement law, providing a targeted political solution without reducing 
the scope of Article 56 TFEU in general.
The CJEU has been equally been unwilling to limit the scope of Article 56 
TFEU based on the social or political sensitivity of certain services.16 Both 
11   Case C-159/90, Grogan ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, Case C-268/99 Jany ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, or 
Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:2009:519. For a discussion on the ensuing strug-
gle of the CJEU in the area of gambling see S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money 
For Nothing: The Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ 
Common Market Law Review (2011) 48 (4), 1175.
12   Grogan, par. 19.
13   Grogan, par. 20, emphasis added.
14   Grogan, par. 18 and 21.
15   Similarly see Case C-275/92 Schindler ECLI:EU:C:1994:119, par. 32, where the CJEU held 
that ‘Even if the morality of lotteries is at least questionable, it is not for the Court to sub-
stitute its assessment for that of the legislatures of the Member States where that activity 
is practised legally.’
16   Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 129, Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, par. 10, and 
Kohll, paragraph 20.
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healthcare and education, for example, have been brought under the scope 
of Article 56 TFEU, even where this brought the CJEU into contested terrain.17 
For example, as healthcare forms a service, individuals may in principle not be 
restricted from seeking medical treatment in other Member States, which also 
means that this treatment abroad should, under certain conditions, be covered 
by national health insurance.18
In line with the other freedoms, therefore, the CJEU has developed a very 
broad definition of a service, and in doing so has greatly extended the scope of 
Article 56 TFEU. A great many activities qualify as services and therefore are in 
principle entitled to free movement. As we will see below, however, in return 
for this very broad concept of a service, the CJEU is often more lenient when 
assessing restrictions on services in more contested areas.
12.3.2. Distinguishing Services from Other Freedoms: Temporary Nature
Article 57 TFEU provides that an activity only qualifies as a service where it is 
not covered by one of the other freedoms. The primary difficulty in this regard 
is to distinguish services from establishment.19 Say for example that a Spanish 
architect moves to Austria for four months to assist in a large building project, 
renting a turn-key office space for the duration of his stay. Is he ‘merely’ a pro-
vider of services or has he established himself in Austria?
The essential difference between services and establishment is the tempo-
rary nature of the activity. Services are intended to be temporary and limited 
in time. Establishment, on the other hand, is intended to be more permanent 
and open-ended. Yet in practice it can be difficult to differentiate between the 
two. The leading, if not always conclusive, judgment on the difference between 
services and establishment is Gebhard, which concerned a German lawyer 
17   See for healthcare Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, par. 
16, Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931) ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, par. 21, Case C-368/98 
Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363, Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR 
I-5473, C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325 
and Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185) ECLI:EU:C:2007:231. The Court does 
make a distinction, however, between hospital and non-hospital healthcare. See also 
J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: Asser, 2011). For 
education see Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, paragraphs 15 and 16 and Case 
C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849.
18   See also the discussion below on the justification of possible restrictions in this regard.
19   See for financial services and capital Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:631.
 381Freedom of Establishment and Services in the EU
working in Italy.20 On determining whether Gebhard had established himself 
in Italy or had remained a service provider the CJEU held the following:
As the Advocate General has pointed out, the temporary nature of 
the activities in question has to be determined in the light, not only of the 
duration of the provision of the service, but also of its regularity, period-
icity or continuity. The fact that the provision of services is temporary 
does not mean that the provider of services within the meaning of the 
Treaty may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in 
the host Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting 
rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is necessary for the purposes of 
performing the services in question.
However, that situation is to be distinguished from that of Mr Gebhard 
who, as a national of a Member State, pursues a professional activity on 
a stable and continuous basis in another Member State where he holds 
himself out from an established professional base to, amongst others, 
nationals of that State. Such a national comes under the provisions of 
the chapter relating to the right of establishment and not those of the 
chapter relating to services.21
In our example of the Spanish architect moving to Austria, therefore, the archi-
tect would still qualify as a service provider. At the same time, Gebhard does 
not mean that the provision of a service can never last for a very long time. 
In Schnitzer, for example, a Portuguese company carried out plastering in 
Germany for almost three years but still qualified as a service provider:
Thus, ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty may cover services 
varying widely in nature, including services which are provided over an 
extended period, even over several years, where, for example, the services 
in question are supplied in connection with the construction of a large 
building. Services within the meaning of the Treaty may likewise be con-
stituted by services which a business established in a Member State sup-
plies with a greater or lesser degree of frequency or regularity, even over 
an extended period, to persons established in one or more other Member 
States, for example the giving of advice or information for remuneration.
(. . .)
20   Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411.
21   See also Case C-131/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-1659, paragraph 22.
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It follows that the mere fact that a business established in one Member 
State supplies identical or similar services with a greater or lesser degree 
of frequency or regularity in a second Member State, without having an 
infrastructure there enabling it to pursue a professional activity there on 
a stable and continuous basis and, from the infrastructure, to hold itself 
out to, amongst others, nationals of the second Member State, is not suf-
ficient for it to be regarded as established in the second Member State.22
No simple criterion or clear time limit exists, therefore, yet the establishment 
of infrastructure seems to be of particular importance for crossing the thin 
line between services and establishment.23 Because of the grey area between 
both freedoms, it may in some cases be difficult to predict which of the two 
applies. Considering the significant convergence between the freedoms, how-
ever, it will usually also not make a real difference, in terms of outcome, which 
freeform applies.24 Sometimes, the CJEU does not even deem it necessary to 
choose between services and establishment, and simply applies both.25
12.4 Who may Rely on Article 56 TFEU?
Once something qualifies as a service, the question remains which individu-
als are entitled to rely on Article 56 TFEU to demand the free movement of 
this service. When Article 56 TFEU was drafted, the scenario envisioned was 
that of a service provider traveling to a customer in another Member State. It 
would then be the service provider that would rely on Article 56 TFEU to con-
test any restrictions to her free movement.26 In Luisi and Carbone, however, 
the CJEU held that not just service providers but also service recipients may 
rely on Article 56 TFEU.27 This case concerned Italian citizens vacationing in 
22   Case C-215/01 Schnitzer ECLI:EU:C:2003:662, paras 30–32. Also see Case C-458/08 
Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-11599.
23   See already Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany (Insurance Services), where the CJEU also 
clarified that establishment does not require a formal branch or agency, but that an office 
or permanent representative may suffice.
24   See EU Chapter 9 on the gradual convergence between the freedoms.
25   See for example Case C-136/00, Danner ECLI:EU:C:2002:558, or Case C-334/02, Commission 
v. France ECLI:EU:C:2004:129. For a possible combination of services and goods see Case 
C-403/08 Football Association Premier League ECLI:EU:C:2011:631, par. 79 or Case C-390/99 
Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paras. 29 to 33.
26   . See also the early case law of the CJEU fort his assumption, for example Case 33/74 van 
Binsbergen ECLI:EU:C:1974:131 or Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et travaux ECLI:EU:C:1982:49.
27   .Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377.
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Germany and France, where they inter alia received some medical treatment. 
Because they had received services there, they could rely on the free movement 
of services to challenge Italian laws restricting the export of foreign currency:
It follows that the freedom to provide services includes the freedom, 
for the recipients of services, to go to another Member State in order to 
receive a s service there, without being obstructed by restrictions, even in 
relation to payments and that tourists, persons receiving medical treat-
ment and persons travelling for the purpose of education or business are 
to be regarded as recipients of services.28
As a result of this landmark judgment, all individuals that travel to another 
Member State and receive some kind of services may rely on the free move-
ment of services.29 Moreover, any national entities that provide a service to 
such visitors from other Member States may also rely on Article 56 TFEU. For 
example, if a group of Luxemburgish tourists come to Amsterdam and take 
a tour on a canal boat, both these tourists and the operator of the canal boat 
fall under the scope of the free movement of services, and can hence rely on 
Article 56 TFEU to challenge any restriction they may encounter.30 As most 
people that travel to another Member State will receive at least some services, 
such as transport, lodging or restaurant services, this line of case law has greatly 
expanded the scope of Article 56 TFEU.
At the same time, the scope of the freedom to provide services does have 
its limits. To begin with, Article 56 TFEU only applies where a cross-border 
element is present. Purely internal situations, such as a small Hungarian law 
firm providing legal advice to a local Hungarian company, are not covered 
by the freedom to provide services.31 Four possible cross-border scenarios can 
be envisioned.32 Firstly, the service provider may travel to another Member 
28   Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, par. 16.
29   See in this regard also Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, Case Case C-372/04 Watts 
[2006] ECR I-4325 and especially Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195 where the specific 
services received by a British tourist did not even have to be specified.
30   See for example Case C-98/14 Berlington ECLI:EU:C:2015:386, paras. 25 and 26 and Joined 
Cases C-340/14 and Case C-341/14 Trijber ECLI:EU:C:2015:641.
31   Cf. Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. [1999] ECR I-5219; ECLI:EU:C:1999:400 or Case 52/79 Debauve 
[1980] ECR 83.
32   Compare also the four ‘modes’ under the Common Market Protocol Schedule of 
Commitment on the Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V), as discussed in 
Chapter 12 par. 2.
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State to provide a service.33 Secondly, under Luisi and Carbone, service recipi-
ents may travel to another Member State to receive a service. Thirdly, the 
service itself may cross a border, for example via the internet.34 Fourthly, 
the service provider and the service recipient may travel together to another 
Member State, for example with an Irish consultant joining his Irish client on 
a business trip to Malta.35
In addition, Article 56 TFEU only covers service providers that have the 
nationality of a Member State and are established in a Member State.36 Service 
recipients, however, do not have to meet the double requirement of nationality 
and establishment. Even third-country nationals, therefore, can rely on article 
56 TFEU when they receive a service from an EU provider.37 A Rwandese busi-
nesswoman in Brussels may, for example, rely on article 56 TFEU when receiv-
ing lobbying services from a UK law firm. Lastly, it seems that Article 56 TFEU 
still only has vertical direct, as its horizontal direct effect remains uncertain.38
12.5 Restrictions on the Free Movement of Services
The concept of a restriction under Article 56 TFEU is functionally similar to the 
very broad concept developed by the CJEU in Dassonville for goods, and also 
focuses on market access.39 The standard definition was provided in Säger, 
were the CJEU held that Article 56 TFEU requires:
33   Note that here it is not required that the specific service recipient in that other MS has 
already been identified. Mere offers of services, without any identified customers as yet, 
therefore also fall under the freedom. See Alpine investments par. 19. In addition, Art. 56 
TFEU also applies if a customer moves to another Member State, and hence the service 
relationship acquires a cross-border element. See Case 15/78 Koestler [1978] ECR 1971) 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:184.
34   Refs Alpine Investments par. 22.
35   Cf. Case C-154/89, Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76 or Case C-398/95, Syndesmos 
ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion ECLI:EU:C:1997:282.
36   See however also the other rights Union citizens and their family members may derive 
from their citizenship, as discussed in EU Chapter 11.
37   . Case C-484/93, Svensson and Gustavsson ECLI:EU:C:1995:379.
38   For vertical direct effect see Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, par. 27. For the 
complex case law on horizontal or quasi-horizontal effect see inter alia Case C-309/99 
Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, par. 120, Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 and 
especially Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
39   See EU Chapter 10 as well as Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite ECLI:EU:C:2002:34 and 
T. Connor, ‘Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union: Jurisprudential 
Routes to Free Movement’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal, 159. For the earlier case law of 
the CJEU on this point, which differentiated more between indirect discrimination and 
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(. . .) the abolition of any restriction even if it applies without distinction 
to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider 
of services established in another Member State where he lawfully pro-
vides similar services.40
No discrimination is therefore required, the criterion only being if there is a 
chance that a national measure will make it more difficult to provide or receive 
cross-border services.41 Importantly, this concept also covers any national rule 
that creates a so-called ‘double burden’ by replicating safeguards already in 
place in the home state of the service provider. Consequently, Member States 
may in principle not impose their own regulations on a foreign service pro-
vider on points where the provider is already regulated by its home state.42 
Otherwise, the mere duplication of national rules and requirements would in 
itself already restrict free movements, such as a free lance pilot that would 
have to make training hours in five different Member States.
Article 56 TFEU not only provides service providers the right to enter and 
reside in the Member State, but also to bring all staff they use for providing 
the service, including Third Country National (TCN) staff.43 Accidentally, this 
inclusion of free movement rights for service providers and their staff also 
means that, if the UK wants to retain the free movement of services after 
Brexit, they would indirectly also accept a significant amount of free move-
ment of persons.
Although the scope of the prohibition under Article 56 TFEU, therefore, is 
at least as broad as that under Article 34 TFEU concerning goods, the CJEU has 
not extended the Keck exception to services.44 Consequently, as with the other 
non-discriminatory measures, see S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four 
Freedoms (4th edn, OUP 2015), 387 a.o.
40   Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, par. 12.
41   See also Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:2009:519and Case C-384/93 Alpine 
Investments ECLI:EU:C:1995:126.
42   See for example Case C-272/94, Michel Guiot and Climatec ECLI:EU:C:1996:147.
43   Case C113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, par. 12, as well as Cases 62/81 and 63/81 
Seco and Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d’ Assurance contre la Vieillesse et l’ Invalidité 
[1982] ECR 223, Case C-355/98 Commision v. Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221, and Case C-43/93 
Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, par. 21. For the question which labour standards and social 
laws apply, see Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services [1996] OJ L18/1 as well as Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
44   See for example Joined Cases C-34–36/95 De Agostini ECLI:EU:C:1997:344, Case C-275/92 
Schindler ECLI:EU:C:1994:119 or Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments ECLI:EU:C:1995:126. For 
the Keck exception see EU Chapter 10, par. 4.1. See also W.H. Roth, ‘The European Court 
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freedoms, the main legal debate takes place over the issue of justification, not 
so much over the existence of a restriction itself.
12.6 Justifications of Restrictions on the Free Movement of Services
As with the other freedoms, a restriction on Article 56 TFEU can be justified 
if it serves a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.45 For services as well, 
the legitimate aims allowed under Article 51 and 52 TFEU have been judicially 
complemented by an open category of rule of reason exceptions.46 Under the 
rule of reason, the CJEU has already accepted a great variety of aims that may 
justify a restriction, including consumer protection,47 cultural policy,48 pre-
venting abuse of free movement of services,49 professional rules protecting the 
recipient of services,50 or the right to take collective action for the protection 
of the workers of the host State against possible social dumping.51 The one 
main limit is that purely economic aims, such as safeguarding revenue or pro-
tecting a certain economic sector, cannot form legitimate aims under the rule 
of reason.52 In addition, as in the case of goods, the orthodox doctrine holds 
of Justice’s Case Law on Freedom to Provide Services: is Keck Relevant?’, in M. Andenas, 
W.-H. Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law (OUP, 2002), 1.
45   See amongst many others Case C-678/11 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2014:2434, Case 
C-523/12 Dirextra Alta Formazione ECLI:EU:C:2013:831, par. 24 or Joined Cases C-369/96 
and C-376/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453, par. 35.
46   For the rule of reason exceptions see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221. On the strict 
application of the Treaty exceptions see for example Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:235, Joined Cases C-430 & 431/99 Sea-Land Service ECLI:EU:C:2002:364, 
Case C-158/96 Kohll ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, or Case C-465/05 Commission v. Italy ECLI:EU: 
C:2007:781, par. 49.
47   Case 220/83 Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1986:461, Case C-393/05 Commission v. 
Austria ECLI:EU:C:2007:722, or Case C-404/05 Commission v. Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:723.
48   Case C-154/89 Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76, Case C-125/06 Commission v. 
Infront [2008] ECR I-1451, or Case C-195/06 KommAustria v. ORF [2007] ECR I-8817.
49   Case C-244/04 Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-885, par. 38.
50   Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, Case C-19/92 Kraus ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, or 
Case C-309/99 Wouters ECLI:EU:C:2002:98.
51   Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
52   See inter alia Case C-338/09 Yellow Cab ECLI:EU:C:2010:814, or Case C-347/09 Dickinger 
and Ömer ECLI:EU:C:2011:582. The risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of 
the social security system does, however, constitute a legitimate aim. See for example 
Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms ECLI:EU:C:2001:404 and Case C-372/04 Watts ECLI: 
EU:C:2006:325.
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that directly discriminatory measures can only be justified under Treaty-based 
exceptions, whereas the rule of reason can only justify indistinctly applicable 
measures.53
One of the main perculiarties in the justification of services, however, is 
the variation in leeway offered to Member States depending on which service 
is at stake. This leeway is especially granted via a more relaxed application 
of the proportionality test, which requires that a restriction is both suitable 
and necessary to achieve its objective.54 These open criteria allow the court 
to increase or reduce its scrutiny, which in turn allows the CJEU to tweak 
the formally one-size-fits-all free movement test for different services. In more 
economic or standard commercial areas, and therefore the majority of cases, 
the application of the proportionality test is usually very strict, for instance 
requiring Member States to proof that there really was no less restrictive 
alternative.55 In more sensitive areas, the CJEU sometimes satisfies itself with 
a more limited review, merely checking if the national measure is not mani-
festly inappropriate.56 The clearest example of the significant leeway the CJEU 
can create for Member States, whilst formally remaining within the standard 
internal market test, can be found in the context of gambling, where Member 
States have received all but a carte blanche to regulate games of chance.57 This 
variation in scrutiny allows for the necessary flexibility in such a diverse field 
as services, but of course also comes at a cost of legal certainty.
53   See for example Case C-353/89 Commission v. Netherlands ECLI:EU:C:1991:325, or Case 
C-451/99 Cura Anlagen ECLI:EU:C:2002:195, as well as S. O’Leary and J.M. Fernández-
Martín, ‘Judicially-Created Exceptions to the Free Provision of Services’, in M. Andenas, 
W.-H. Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law (OUP, 2002), 163. For cases that do not 
fit this pattern, see for example Case C-118/96 Safir ECLI:EU:C:1998:170.
54   See for example Case C-49/98 Finalarte ECLI:EU:C:2001:564. The suitability test also 
includes the requirement of consistency, meaning that the measure may be internally 
inconsistent or in part undermine the very objective it is trying to realize. See Case 
C-243/01 Gambelli ECLI:EU:C:2003:597, par. 68.
55   Case C-678/11 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2014:2434, par. 43.
56   See for example Case C-262/02 Commission v. France (Loi Evin) ECLI:EU:C:2004:431, espe-
cially the reasoning in paras 33–39.
57   See for an overview S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money For Nothing: The Case 
Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ (2011) 48 (4) Common 
Market Law Review, 1175, and for recent developments which may herald some increased 
scrutiny, S.C.G.Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers, ‘Let it be? The regulation and allocation of 
gambling licenses at the EU and Member State level’, in: C. Adriaanse, F.J. van Ommeren, 
W. den Ouden and C.J. Wolswinkel (Eds.), Scarcity and the State The Allocation of Limited 
Rights by the Administration (Intersentia, 2016), 299.
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12.7 The Services Directive
The negative integration achieved through Article 56 TFEU as set out above has 
also been complemented by positive integration, i.e. by EU legislation harmo-
nizing national laws.58 Of significant importance has been the sectoral legisla-
tion, which regulated particular fields such as telecommunication, energy or 
financial services, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Chapter.59
In 2006, however, a general directive on services in the internal market 
was adopted, the Services Directive.60 This Directive became the subject of 
hitherto unprecedented levels of political contestation and protest, including 
French plumbers cutting of electricity to the holiday home of then internal 
market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein as they feared unfair competition from 
the dreaded ‘Polish plumber’.61 The main bone of contention was the ‘coun-
try of origin principle’ proposed by the Commission, which basically required 
mutual recognition of home state control. Such mutual recognition would 
remove many obstacles in one fell swoop, but was also perceived as undermin-
ing national protection of workers and service providers.
Under intense political pressure, the final Directive was severely watered 
down, many services excluded from its scope, and the country of origin princi-
ple scrapped.62 The resulting Directive does not add very much in terms of sub-
stantive free movement rights, as the key Article 16 on free movement largely 
repeats Article 56 TFEU. Nevertheless, the Services Directive has affected the 
application of the free movement of services and also provides several relevant 
procedural rights to service procedures in terms of administrative simplifica-
tion and cooperation.63 Overall, however, the Directive is far from a success, 
and the EAC could certainly learn both from the botched political process and 
58   See EU Chapter 9 for a discussion of this process in general.
59   See in this context also Chapter 16 on sectoral regulation in the EAC.
60   Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the 
internal market OJ [2006] L376/37. On the preceding debates, see Editorial Comments 
(2006) CML Rev., 307–311. On the evolution of the proposal, see J.-V. Louis and S. Rodrigues 
(Eds.) Les services d’intérêt général et l’Union européenne Brussels, 2006; O. de Schutter 
and S. Francq, “La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le Marché intérieur: 
reconnaissance mutuelle, harmonisation et conflicts de lois dans l’Europe élargie”, (2005) 
CDE, 603–660.
61   On the heated discussions surrounding the Directive see Editorial Comments (2006) 
CMLRev, 307–311.
62   C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, (2008) 45(2) CMLRev, 323. On the scope 
and application see for example Case C-341/14 Trijber ECLI:EU:C:2015:641.
63   See chapter II of the Services Directive.
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the eventual watered-down compromise. For example, one could first aim 
for the more limited but pragmatic objective of administrative simplification 
and cooperation alone, before trying any more radical steps such as introduc-
ing a country of origin principle.
12.8 The Freedom of Establishment
Article 49 TFEU contains the right to freedom of establishment, allowing natu-
ral and legal persons to establish themselves in other Member States:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory 
of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also 
apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiar-
ies by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any 
Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertak-
ings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own 
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, 
subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.64
Article 54 TFEU then further clarifies the concept of a company or a firm:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or prin-
cipal place of business within the Union shall, for the purposes of this 
Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals 
of Member States.
‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under 
civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are 
non-profit-making.
64   The vertical direct effect of Article 49 TFEU was established in Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] 
ECR 631.
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As a counterpart to the freedom to provide services, which is temporary 
in nature, establishment concerns a more permanent economic activity in 
another Member State. In the words of the CJEU, it allows an entity to ‘partici-
pate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State 
other than his State of origin.’65
Article 49 TFEU covers both private individuals (the self-employed), and the 
legal persons as defined in Article 54 TFEU. Moreover, it covers both primary 
and secondary establishment, which means that it not just enables one to move 
completely to a new state to start a new company, but also to set up a second 
office or to create agencies, branches or subsidiaries in another Member State 
whilst keeping the primary company in the own Member State.66 As with ser-
vices, however, activities connected with the exercise of public authority are 
excluded.67
Just as the free movement of services, the freedom of establishment 
provides a right to market access and residence which also includes family 
members.68 Member States, therefore, are in principle prohibited to adopt 
any measures that restrict natural or legal persons from primary or secondary 
establishment.69 The justification of any such restrictions, as indicated above, 
is very similar to that of the free movement of services, requiring a legitimate 
aim that is pursued in a proportionate manner.70
One major debate unique to the freedom of establishment concerns the 
seat of undertakings and the freedom of companies under EU law to change 
their seat. In part this debate is caused by the fact that some Member States 
follow the real seat doctrine, whereas others follow the incorporation doctrine 
to determine the seat. So what happens, for example, if a company first estab-
lishes its real seat in Member State A, which follows the real seat doctrine, but 
then wants to move its seat to Member State B, which follows the incorporation 
65   Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, par. 25.
66   See for primary establishment for example Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631 or Case 
C-411/03 SEVIC [2005] ECR I-10805. For secondary establishment see Case 107/83 Klopp 
[1984] ECR 2971 or Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459.
67   As an exception, this concept is interpreted very narrowly as well, cf. Case 42/92 Thijssen 
[1993] ECR I-4047.
68   See Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.
69   See for examples inter alia Case C-161/07 Commission v. Austria ECLI:EU:C:2008:759, Case 
208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919 or Case C-169/07 Hartlauer ECLI:EU:C:2009:141.
70   Free movement of services and the freedom of establishment even share the same Treaty 
justifications, and many of the same rule of reason grounds apply to both as well. Note 
in this regard that the Services Directive, as set out above, also applies to establishment, 
further demonstrating the similarities and connections between both.
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doctrine, by merely incorporating its new seat in Member State B whilst keep-
ing its real seat in Member State A? Although the case law is not fully clear yet, 
so far it seems that Member States remain free to determine which connecting 
factor they take into account for determining the initial seat as well as the con-
necting factor they require for maintaining a seat.71 For the EAC this question 
may become relevant as well, if differences in incorporation doctrines exist 
between Partner States, and if companies would increasingly start to use the 
freedom of establishment, for example for tax purposes.
71   See especially Case C-212/97) Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, Case C-208/00) Überseering 
[2002] ECR I-9919, and Case C-210/06) Cartesio [2008] ECR I-9641.
